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Abstract

personnel can perform their tasks only if the location of the
hazardous event (reported by sensors) is known. Location
information is also important for geographic routing protocols, in which such information (in the form of coordinates)
is used to select the next forwarding host among the sender’s
neighbors [2,3,14,18,21,42]. Because of the constraints on
sensors, finding locations for sensors is a challenging problem. The location discovery problem is referred to as localization problem in the literature.

In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), sensors’ locations
play a critical role in many applications. Having a GPS receiver on every sensor node is costly. In the past, a number
of location discovery (localization) schemes have been proposed. Most of these schemes share a common feature: they
use some special nodes, called beacon nodes, which are assumed to know their own locations (e.g., through GPS receivers or manual configuration). Other sensors discover
their locations based on the reference information provided
by these beacon nodes.
Most of the beacon-based localization schemes assume a
benign environment, where all beacon nodes are supposed
to provide correct reference information. However, when
the sensor networks are deployed in a hostile environment,
where beacon nodes can be compromised, such an assumption does not hold anymore.
In this paper, we propose a general scheme to detect localization anomalies that are caused by adversaries. Our
scheme is independent from the localization schemes. We
formulate the problem as an anomaly intrusion detection
problem, and we propose a number of ways to detect localization anomalies. We have conducted simulations to evaluate the performance of our scheme, including the false positive rates, the detection rates, and the resilience to node
compromises.

The Global Positioning System (GPS) [13] solves the
problem of localization in outdoor environments for PCclass nodes. However, due to the cost reason, it is highly undesirable to have a GPS receiver on every sensor node. This
creates a demand for efficient and cost-effective localization algorithms in sensor networks. In the past several years,
a number of localization protocols have been proposed to
reduce or completely remove the dependence on GPS in
wireless sensor networks [4, 6, 12, 29–32, 35, 36]. Most of
these schemes share a common feature: they use some special nodes, called beacon nodes, which are assumed to know
their own locations (e.g., through GPS receivers or manual
configuration). Other sensors discover their locations based
on the beacons provided by these beacon nodes.
Sensor networks may be deployed in hostile environments, where sensor nodes can be compromised, beacon
nodes can be compromised, communication can be redirected, etc. Most of the proposed localization schemes are
designed to work in environments where all the beacon
nodes behave correctly; when those nodes can be compromised and act maliciously, sensors using the existing localization schemes might be misled to believe that they are
in locations far away from their actual locations. This can
cause severe consequence. For example, when sensor networks are used for battle fields surveillance, if sensors are
misled by enemies, such that their derived locations are far
off, then when sensors report that their regions are safe, this
wrong information can cause significant damage. Therefore, it will be of great importance if sensors can discover
whether their derived location is correct or not.

1. Introduction
Sensor networks have been proposed for various applications. In many of these applications, nodes need to find
their locations. For example, in rescue applications, rescue
∗
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2. Related Work

In this paper we propose a novel scheme to detect malicious attacks in localizations. Our scheme takes advantage of the deployment knowledge that is available in many
sensor network applications. For example, let us look at a
deployment method that uses an airplane to deploy sensor
nodes. The sensors are first pre-arranged in a sequence of
smaller groups. These groups are dropped out of the airplane sequentially as the plane flies forward. This is analogous to parachuting troops or dropping cargo in a sequence.
The positions where the sensor groups are dropped out of
the airplane are referred to as deployment points; their coordinates can be easily determined (e.g. using GPS) and stored
in sensors’ memories prior to sensors’ deployment. During
the deployment, sensors can land on random locations, the
distribution of which usually follows some probability distribution function (pdf) that can be modeled prior to the deployment. Although not all sensor network are deployed
like this, deployment knowledge can be modeled more or
less for many sensor network deployments.

2.1. Localization Problems and Schemes
In the past several years, a number of localization protocols have been proposed to reduce or completely remove
the dependence on GPS in wireless sensor networks [1, 4–
6, 11, 12, 29–33, 35, 36].
Most localization solutions in sensor networks require
a few nodes called beacons (which are also called anchors
or reference points), which already know their absolute locations via GPS or manual configuration. The density of
the anchors depends on the characteristics and probably the
budget of the network since GPS is a costly solution. Anchors are typically equipped with high-power transmitters
to broadcast their location beacons. The remainders of the
nodes then compute their own locations from the knowledge of the known locations and the communication links.
Based on the type of knowledge used in localization, localization schemes are divided into two classes: range-based
schemes and range-free schemes.
Range-based protocols use absolute point-to-point distance or angle information to calculate the location between neighboring sensors. Common techniques for distance/angle estimation include Time of Arrival (TOA) [13],
Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) [1,11,33], Angle of Arrival (AOA) [31], and Received Signal Strength (RSS) [1].
While producing fine-grained locations, range-based protocols remain cost-ineffective due to the cost of hardware for
radio, sound, or video signals, as well as the strict requirements on time synchronization and energy consumption.
Alternatively, coarse-grained range-free protocols
are cost-effective because no distance/angle measurement among nodes is involved. In such schemes, errors
can be masked by fault tolerance of the network, redundancy computation, and aggregation [12]. A simple algorithm proposed in [4] and [5] computes the location as the
centroid of its proximate anchor nodes. It induces low overhead, but high inaccuracy as compared to others. An alternate solution, DV-Hop [32], extends the single-hop broadcast to multiple-hop flooding, so that sensors can find their
distance from the anchors in terms of hop counts. Using the information about the average distance per hop,
sensors can estimate their distance from the anchors. Amorphous positioning scheme [29] adopts a similar strategy
as DV-Hop; the major difference is that Amorphous improves location estimates using offline hop-distance estimations through neighbor information exchange.
Another existing range-free scheme is APIT algorithm [12]. APIT resolves the localization problem by isolating the environment into triangular regions between
anchor nodes. A node uses the point-in-triangle test to determine its relative location with triangles formed by

We show that, equipped with deployment knowledge,
sensors can efficiently detect localization anomalies. Our
strategy is let sensors verify whether their derived locations are consistent with the deployment knowledge. The
level of inconsistency that is above certain threshold is usually an indicator of malicious attacks. We formulate this
inconsistency as an anomaly and study this problem in
the framework of anomaly intrusion detection by leveraging the methodologies from the intrusion detection field.
We call our problem the Localization Anomaly Detection
(LAD) problem. We study the effectiveness of our proposed
scheme in this paper.
In addition to being effective in detection attacks against
the localization, a localization anomaly detection scheme
must also resist against attacks on the detection scheme
itself. As much as adversaries like to attack localization
schemes, they will attack the detection scheme if they know
such a scheme is deployed. There are a number of attacks
the adversaries can launch. We have developed a mathematical framework to model those attacks, and this model
is used in our simulation-based evaluation to generate attacks. Our results show that the proposed detection scheme
is highly resilient against attacks that can cause large damage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next
section describes the related work. Section 3 presents the
modeling of deployment knowledge. Section 4 formally defines the Localization Anomaly Detection problem. Section 5 describes our proposed LAD detection scheme.
Section 6 describes the potential attacks on our detection scheme. Section 7 then presents the evaluation results.
Finally we conclude and lay out some future work in Section 8.
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anchors and thus narrows down the area in which it probably resides. APIT defines the center of gravity of the
intersection of all triangles that a node resides in as the estimated node location.
Localization can also be achieved without using beacons. A beaconless localization scheme is described in [8].
Instead of using the beacon information, the beaconless
scheme uses the deployment knowledge to derive the location.

nodes that are close to the victim, SeRLoc will still have
hard time deriving the correct locations.

2.3. Intrusion Detection
The proposed approaches fall into the general field of intrusion detection. Intrusion detection has been studied for
more than twenty years. Intrusion detection techniques have
been traditionally classified into anomaly detection and misuse detection. Anomaly detection models the normal behaviors of the subjects being monitored and identifies anything that significantly deviates from the normal behaviors as attacks. Many techniques have been proposed for
anomaly detection, including statistical approaches (e.g.,
Haystack [38], NIDES/STAT [17]), machine learning approaches (e.g., TIM [39], IBL [22]), computer immunological approaches [9, 10, 41], and specification based approaches [19, 20, 37, 40]. Misuse detection models the patterns of known attacks or vulnerabilities, and identifies actions that conform to such patterns as attacks. Existing approaches include rule-based methods (e.g., ASAX [28], PBEST [27]), state transition based methods [7, 16], and data
mining approaches [24, 25]. Most of these techniques cannot be directly applied to sensor networks due to the resource constraints on sensor nodes. The technique proposed
in this paper are specifically targeted at detecting localization anomalies in sensor networks; it differs from the traditional intrusion detection techniques in that it specifically
exploits the semantics of localization to identify the anomalies.

2.2. Localization in Hostile Environments
Most of the current localization schemes become vulnerable when there are malicious attacks. Although authentication can be used to protect the integrity of the messages
sent by beacon nodes, it will not help if beacon nodes themselves are compromised, because a compromised beacon
node may provide incorrect location references. If a sensor uses these incorrect references, it may derive a false location.
One way to find out whether a beacon node is providing correct information or not is to verify the location of
the beacon nodes, but no effective solution has been proposed to solve the location verification problem. Sastry et
al. made the first attempt towards solving this problem [34].
They proposed a protocol named Echo to verify a node’s
location claims using both radio frequency and ultrasound.
However, the Echo protocol only verifies whether a node
is inside a region or not, it does not verify whether a sensor node is at certain specific location.
Our proposed technique differs from the Echo protocol in the following ways. First, the proposed technique is
aimed at a broader problem than the Echo protocol. While
the Echo protocol is to verify whether a sensor node is
inside a region to facilitate location-based access control,
our scheme is aimed at detecting any location estimation
anomaly at any sensor node. Second, the Echo protocol relies on the existence of a very fast (e.g., radio frequency)
and a relatively slow (e.g., ultrasound) signals to derive distance from time delay; our approach does not need those
special signals.
Although the beaconless localization scheme does not
use beacons, it does have a similar problem in hostile environments. Because a sensor using this scheme relies on its
neighbors to find out the location, if the neighbors are compromised, the estimated location will be incorrect. The work
described in [8] assumes that the localization scheme is performed in a benign environment, and it does not show how
to deal with the hostile environment.
Recently, Lazos and Poovendran propose a new rangeindependent localization scheme, SeRLoc, which can tolerate malicious attacks to certain degree [23]. However, when
beacon nodes can be compromised, especially those beacon

3. Modeling of the Deployment Knowledge
In this section, we present a model for a specific type of
deployment. However, the general approach that we use in
this paper can be applied to other deployment models. Focusing on a specific deployment model in this paper allows
us to evaluate the effectiveness of our detection scheme in
a concrete scenario. Evaluation for other deployment models will also be pursued in the future.
We assume that sensor nodes are static once they are deployed. We define the deployment point of a sensor as the
point location where the sensor is to be deployed. This is
not the location where this sensor finally resides. The sensor
node can reside at points around this deployment point according to a certain probability distribution. As an example,
let us consider the case where sensors are deployed from a
helicopter. The deployment point of such a sensor is the location where the sensor is thrown out of the helicopter. We
also define the resident point of a sensor as the point location where the sensor finally resides.
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Figure 1. A deployment example (each solid
dot represents a deployment point).
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Figure 2. Deployment distribution for one
group.

3.1. Group-based Deployment Model
bution). Gaussian distribution is widely studied and used in
practice. Although we only employ the Gaussian distribution in this paper, our methodology can also be applied to
other distributions.
We assume that the deployment distribution for any node
k in group Gi follows a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution, which is centered at the deployment point (xi , yi ).
Namely, the mean of the Gaussian distribution µ equals
(xi , yi ), and the pdf for node k in group Gi is the following [26]:

In practice, it is quite common that nodes are deployed
in groups, i.e., a group of sensors are deployed at a single
deployment point, and the probability distribution functions
of the final resident points of all the sensors from the same
group are the same.
In this work, we assume such a group-based deployment,
and we model the deployment knowledge in the following
(we call this model the group-based deployment model):
1. N sensor nodes to be deployed are divided into n
equal-size groups so that each group, Gi , for i =
1, . . . , n is deployed from the deployment point with
index i. To simplify the notion, we also use Gi to
represent the corresponding deployment point, and let
(xi , yi ) represent its coordinates.

1 −[(x−xi )2 +(y−yi )2 ]/2σ2
e
2πσ 2
= f (x − xi , y − yi ),

fki (x, y | k ∈ Gi ) =

where σ is the standard deviation, and f (x, y) =
1
−(x2 +y 2 )/2σ 2
.
2πσ 2 e
Although the distribution function for each single group
is not uniform, we still want the sensor nodes to be evenly
deployed throughout the entire region. By choosing a proper
distance between the neighboring deployment points with
respect to the value of σ in the pdf, the probability of finding a node in each small region can be made approximately
equal.

2. The deployment points are arranged in a grid (see Figure 1). Note that the scheme we developed for gridbased deployment can be easily extended to other deployment strategies, such as deployments where the
deployment points form hexagon shapes, or deployments where the deployment points are random (as
long as their locations are given to all sensors).
3. During deployment, the resident point of a node k in
group Gi follows a probability distribution function
fki (x, y | k ∈ Gi ) = f (x − xi , y − yi ). An example of the pdf f (x, y) is a two-dimensional Gaussian
distribution. Figure 2 shows an example of the twodimensional Gaussian distribution at the deployment
point (150, 150).

3.3. Computing g(z)
We derive a number of formulae that will be used later in
our detection scheme. We assume that the probability that a
node from group Gi can land at a location ℓ distance from
the deployment point of Gi follows a Gaussian distribution.
That is:
1 − ℓ22
e 2σ ,
fR (ℓ | ni ∈ Gi ) =
2πσ 2
where R is the wireless transmission range and σ is the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution.

3.2. Deployment Distribution
In this paper, we model the sensor deployment distribution as a Gaussian distribution (also called Normal distri-
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Theorem 1 We define g(z | ni ∈ Gi ) as the probability that the sensor node ni from group i resides within the
neighborhood of a sensor that is z distance from the deployment point of group Gi . Based on geometry knowledge, we
can derive the following formula:
g(z | ni ∈ Gi )

(R−z)2
− 2σ2
= 1{z < R} 1 − e
Z z+R
fR (ℓ | ni ∈ Gi )
+
|z−R|
 2

ℓ + z 2 − R2
·2ℓ cos−1
dℓ,
2ℓz

scheme proposed in the literature. We focus only on the detection phase, namely, to detect whether the derived location is consistent with this node’s actual neighborhood information.
In what follows, we use |L1 − L2 | to represent the distance between two locations L1 and L2 .
Definition 1 (Localization Error) Let La = (xa , ya ) represent the actual location of a sensor v. Let Le = (xe , ye )
represent the location that the sensor derives via certain localization scheme (note that the localization scheme might
be under attacks). We call the distance between Le and La
the localization error.

(1)

Most of the sensor networks applications can and should
be able to tolerate certain degree of localization errors because, unlike the GPS scheme, all the localization schemes
in sensor networks cannot produce very accurate results. We
call the error that a sensor network can tolerate the Maximum Tolerable Error (MTE), the value of which is application dependent. We define the anomaly based on MTE.

where 1{·} is the set indicator function: the value of 1{·} is
1 when the evaluated condition is true, and 0 otherwise.
Proof. Due to the page limitation, the proof is omitted from
this paper.
Therefore, gi (θ), the probability that a node from the deployment group Gi can land within the neighborhood of
point θ = (x, y), can be computed in the following (where
(xi , yi ) represents the deployment point of group Gi ):
p
gi (θ) = g( (x − xi )2 + (y − yi )2 | ni ∈ Gi ).

Definition 2 (Anomaly) An anomaly is defined as a phenomenon in which the localization error is greater than the
Maximum Tolerable Error (MTE), i.e., |Le − La | > MTE.
To attack a sensor network’s localization, attackers need
to cause the localization to generate an error that is beyond
the network’s maximum tolerable error; otherwise, the attacks are not considered as effective. The greater such error is, the more successful the attacks are. An attack causing |Le − La | = 120 leads to more severe damage than an
attack that causes |Le − La | = 60. We quantify the severity of an attack using the error that the attack can achieve,
and we use this quantification to further define the anomaly
with different degrees of damage.

For simplicity, we use g(z) to represent g(z | ni ∈ Gi )
in the rest of this paper, when it is obvious to see from the
context that we are referring to the nodes in group Gi .
The formula for g(z) is quite complicated, and we cannot afford to compute it using Equation (1) in sensor networks. We can solve the performance problem using the
table-lookup approach, i.e., we precompute g(z), and store
the values in a table. More specifically, we divide the range
of z into ω equal-size sub-ranges, and store the g(z) values for these ω + 1 dividing points into a table. When a sensor needs to compute g(z0 ), it looks up the table, and finds
the sub-range that contains z0 ; then it uses the interpolation to compute g(z0 ). The computation takes only constant
time. Our results also show that to gain satisfactory level of
accuracy, ω does not need to be very large.

Definition 3 (D-Anomaly) An anomaly is called Danomaly if the localization error is greater than D,
i.e., |Le − La | > D. D is called the Degree of Damage. D is chosen by attackers based on their targeted
errors.
If the error |Le − La | is observable, we can easily decide whether a phenomenon is D-anomaly by comparing
|Le − La | with D; however, the actual location La is not
observable, so we need to turn to other observable metrics to find out whether |Le − La | is beyond D or not. The
goal of this paper is to develop such a metric A and its corresponding threshold (called the detection threshold), such
that when A is larger than the detection threshold, we can
say that the localization is abnormal. Ideally, a metric A
should satisfy the following property: the metric A is larger
than the detection threshold if and only if |Le − La | > D.
Unfortunately, such a metric, if exists at all, is difficult to
find. In this paper, we turn to heuristic metrics, and we want
the above property to be satisfied as much as possible.

4. The Localization Anomaly Detection Problem
We introduce a localization anomaly detection phase after the localization phase. In the localization phase, sensors derive their locations. Then in the detection phase,
sensors verify whether the derived locations are correct or
not. A failure of the verification indicates an anomaly. In
this paper, we assume that the localization phase has already ended, and each sensor has already derived a location. This phase can be performed using any localization
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5.1. The Detection Scheme

Because the above ideal property cannot always be satisfied for the metric A we select, there will be situations
when A is larger than the detection threshold, but the distance metric |Le − La | is still below D. In this case, a false
alarm will be raised, so we call this situation a false positive.
Similarly, there will be situations when A is smaller than
the detection threshold, but the distance metric |Le − La |
is larger than D. In this case, our metric will fail to raise
an alarm, and we call this situation a false negative. A good
metric A should be able to minimize both false positive and
false negative rates.

5. Detecting Localization Anomalies
ing Deployment Knowledge

After sensors are deployed, each sensor broadcasts its
group id to its neighbors, and each sensor can count the
number of neighbors from Gi , for i = 1, . . . , n. Assume
that a sensor finds out that it has o1 , . . . , on neighbors from
group G1 , . . . , Gn , respectively. We call o = (o1 , . . . , on )
the observation of the sensor. Because the observations at
different locations can be very different, especially when
two locations are far away from each other, we can use the
observation to verify whether the localization result is consistent with the observation.
Based on the estimated location Le = (xe , ye ) and the
deployment knowledge, a sensor can derive the expected
observations and the likelihood of its actual observations.
If the expected observations are too different from its actual observations, or if the likelihood of the actual observation at Le is too low, a sensor can claim that Le is inconsistent with the actual observations, which indicates an
anomaly.
We propose three metrics for anomaly detection. The objective of this study is to investigate how effective these metrics are.

Us-

Based on deployment knowledge, we illustrate the key
idea of our localization anomaly detection scheme using the
following example: Assume that the deployment follows the
pattern described in Figure 1. Also assume that a sensor v is
actually at the location O, but due to the attacks, its derived
localization result says P . According to its actual location,
v is supposed to observe many neighbors from groups A, B,
C, and D. That is, group A is deployed at point A, group B
is deployed at point B, etc. On the other hand, v is not supposed to see many neighbors from groups E, F , G, or H.
However, if P is v’s actual location, v should see the opposite. Therefore, the observations at the locations O and P
are different. The farther apart O and P are, the more different their observations are. Since v’s actual observation at
the location O is already known and its expected observation at the location P can be calculated using the deployment knowledge, we can compare these two observations.
If they deviate substantially from each other, we can determine that v’s localization result P is inconsistent with its
actual observation.

5.2. The Difference Metric
Let Le = (xe , ye ) represent a sensor node v’s estimated
location derived using certain localization scheme. Let o =
(o1 , . . . , on ) represent v’s actual observation. This observation might be tainted by adversaries if some neighbors of v
are compromised by the adversaries. Assume there are no
adversaries, and that v is indeed at the location Le , then we
can compute v’s expected observation µ = (µ1 , . . . , µn ),
where µi represents the expected number of neighbors that
come from group i. If the expected observation µ is close
to the actual observation o, our no-adversary assumption is
probably true; however, if µ and o are very different, the
no-adversary assumption might be false.
Because the probability that a sensor from group i becomes v’s neighbor is gi (Le ), v is expected to see m·gi (Le )
neighbors from group i, where m is the total number of sensors in group i. Therefore, µi can be computed using the following equation:

We propose three metrics to measure the degree of inconsistency between a node’s derived location and its observation. For each metric, we obtain a threshold through training. If the level of inconsistency exceeds such a threshold,
we claim that the localization results are inconsistent with
the observation, thus an alarm will be raised. We have evaluated the effectiveness of our proposed scheme, including
its tolerance to malicious attacks, false positive rates, detection rates, etc. A nice property of our proposed scheme
is that even if the anomaly detection thresholds are not optimally selected, our method still has a high detection rate
and low false alarm rate for large localization errors. This
makes the proposed method an ideal candidate for localization anomaly detection.

µi

= m · gi (L
pe )
= m · g( (xe − xi )2 + (ye − yi )2 ).

(2)

We use the difference between the expected observation µ and the actual observation o to measure how close
these two observations are. The difference DM is defined
as the following:
DM =

n
X
i=1
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| oi − µi | .

We use DM as one of our anomaly indicators. We call
this metric the Difference Metric (or the Diff Metric in
short). When the value of DM is greater than a threshold
value (as we will explain later, such a threshold is derived
via training), we say that the location Le is abnormal.

is too small, it indicates a potential anomaly. Therefore,
we can use this probability as another anomaly indicator.
Since there are n deployment groups, we can compute the
probability value for each group, and choose the smallest
probability value. We then compare this smallest probability value with a threshold (also explained later in Section 7).
If the probability value is smaller than the threshold, we say
that there is an anomaly with the localization result. We call
such a metric the Probability Metric.
Assume a sensor v has estimated its location Le =
(xe , ye ) using a localization scheme. Given the number (m)
of nodes deployed in each group and the pdf function of the
deployment, we can compute the probability that exactly oi
nodes from group Gi (for each i = 1, . . . , n) can be observed by v. Let Xi represent the number of v’s neighbors
that come from group Gi . The probability that the node v at
the location Le has exactly oi neighbors from group i can
be computed using the following formula:

5.3. The Add-all Metric
We use an example to illustrate the motivations underlying this metric. We will use Figure 1 again. Assume that a
node v’s actual location is O, but due to the attacks on the
localization phase, v finds out that its estimated location is
at P . Therefore, we have two sets of observations: one is
node v’s actual observation o at O, the other is the expected
observation µ at P . The observation µ = (µ1 , . . . , µn ) can
be computed using Equation (2).
We define the union of the observations o and µ: let t =
(t1 , . . . , tn ) be the union of the observation µ and o, where
ti is defined as the following:
ti = max{oi , ui }, for i = 1, . . . , n.

PM

(3)

There is an important fact about the observations o and
µ: From Figure 1, we can see that in the observation o, the
number of neighbors from groups A, B, C, and D is high,
but the number of neighbors from groups E, F , G, and H
is low. In the observation µ, the situation is the opposite. If
we union these two observations together, in the resultant
observation t, the the number of neighbors from A, B, C,
D, E, F , G, and H will be high. Therefore, compared to
o and µ, the total number of neighbors in t is higher (we
use |t| to represent the total number of neighbors in t); and
the more different O and P are, the higher the value of |t|
is. On the other hand, if O and P are close to each other,
the observations o and µ should be similar; thus |t| will not
gain much from the union of o and µ.
With the above discussion, we propose to use the total
number of neighbors in the union observation as another
anomaly indicator. Therefore, we define the following metric:
AM =

n
X

= P
 r(X
 i = oi | Le )
m
(m−oi )
o
=
.
(gi (Le )) i (1 − gi (Le ))
oi

If any of the P r(Xi = oi | Le ), for i = 1, . . . , n, is
less than a threshold, our detection will raise an alarm to indicate that the location is abnormal. Obviously, the choice
of the threshold is important, if the threshold is too large,
we will have a lot of false positives; if the threshold is too
small, the false negative rate might be too large.

5.5. Obtaining the Thresholds Using Training
Ideally, to obtain the training data, we need to conduct an
actual sensor network deployment. After the deployment,
each sensor obtains the list of its neighbors, and then uses
a selected localization scheme to estimate its own location.
However, collecting the training data in this way is beyond
our capability; we turn to simulation. We describe our data
collection and training process in the following:
1. Collecting data from simulation: Based on our model
of deployment knowledge, we generate a number of
sensor networks. We randomly select N sensor nodes
from these sensor networks. For each sensor, we collect the following data:

max{oi , ui }.

i=1

We call the metric AM the Add-all Metric. We compare
the result of this metric with a threshold derived from the
training to decide whether the estimated location Le is abnormal.

(a) We obtain the node’s observation o and its actual
location (xa , ya ).
(b) We use a localization scheme to compute the location (xe , ye ) for the node.

5.4. The Probability Metric

2. Training: we compute the proposed metrics for all the
data in the training data sets, using (xa , ya ), (xe , ye ),
and the observations o. The metric results form a sample distribution.

When a sensor node sees oi sensors from group i, based
on its estimated location, the sensor can calculate how likely
it can have oi neighbors from group i. If the probability
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3. Deriving the Detection Threshold: we use τ percentile
to decide a threshold from the metrics computation
results. Namely, the τ percent of the training results
should be within this selected threshold. The value of
τ is a configurable parameter and is application dependent. The value of (1 − τ ) is the false positive rate.1

I am from group 9

I am actually from group 5,
but I am not telling anybody.

For example, for the Diff metric, if through the simulation, we find that τ = 99.99% of the metric results is within
30 in the non-compromised network, we will use 30 as the
detection threshold.
Obtaining thresholds for anomaly detection is in general
a challenging task, because it is usually difficult to observe
all possible “normal” behaviors during the training process.
However, we are targeting at a specific localization application in sensor networks, in which the only inputs are the
estimated locations and the observed neighbor information.
Thus, it is likely to observe most (if not all) of the normal
behaviors during the training process.
Since the anomaly detection thresholds are obtained
through the simulated deployments, the quality of the simulations has a potential impact on the quality of anomaly
detection. However, as we will show through our experiments in Section 7, our anomaly detection method has a
nice property, i.e., our method has a high detection rate and
low false positive rate for large localization errors introduced by attacks, even if the anomaly detection thresholds
are not optimally selected. In other words, the detection performance of the LAD scheme is not sensitive to
the quality of the detection thresholds for high-impact localization anomalies. This property makes the LAD
scheme an ideal candidate for localization anomaly detection.

(a) Silence Attack

(b) Impersonation Attack

I am from group 1
I am from group 8
I am from group 2
Pre−defined
Range
I am from group 28
I am from group 5
(c) Multi−Impersonation Attack

New Range

(d) Range−Change Attack

Figure 3. Various Attacking Scenarios.
Once adversaries have compromised a sensor node, they
can launch a number of attacks in order to corrupt detection. Their goal is to change the victim’s observation, so
they can affect the victim’s detection results. There are four
types of attacks that an adversary can launch against localization (we use o = (o1 , . . . , on ) to represent the victim’s
observation if none of its neighbors is compromised):
• Silence attack: A compromised sensor can keep silent.
If this sensor comes from group i, the victim’s observation oi on group i can be decreased by one.
• Impersonation attack: Instead of reporting its actual
group membership i, a compromised sensor can claim
that it comes from another group, e.g. group j. Therefore, oj can be increase by one.

6. Attacks on Our Detection Scheme

• Multi-Impersonation attack: If no pair-wise authentication mechanism is used, a compromised sensor can
send out many messages, each of which can appear to
come from any group. Therefore, ok (for k = 1, . . . , n)
can be increased by a arbitrary number.

Just like the localization phase, which might be conducted in a hostile environment, the detection phase is conducted in the same environment. This means, if adversaries
have already attacked the localization phase, very likely
they will attack the detection phase to prevent their attacks
on the localization from being detected. Therefore, because
a sensor’s detection is based on the information provided
by its neighbors, we must consider the situations where a
subset of this sensor’s neighbors are compromised. A compromised neighbor can send out false information or refuse
to send out correct information. A good detection scheme
should be able to achieve decent detection rate and low false
positive rate even when a non-trivial portion of the neighbors are compromised.
1

I am actually from group 5

• Range-Change attack: In this attack, the adversaries
cause the range of a compromised node to be changed.
When the compromised node’s range increases, a victim far away from this compromised node will now
consider this node as a neighbor. If this compromised
node comes from group i, the victim’s observation
oi can be increased by one. The range-change attack can be achieved via three different ways: (1)
The compromised sensor can change its transmission
power. (2) The compromised sensor can use wormhole attacks [15]. In the wormhole attack, an attacker
records packets at one location in the network, tunnels
them to another location, and retransmits them there

This false positive rate is for the training data set only, but the actual false positive rate should be close to this value if our deployment
knowledge is modeled correctly.
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into the network. This essentially achieves the rangechange attack. (3) The range-change attack can also
be achieved if adversaries can physically move a compromised node that is outside of the victim’s neighborhood into the victim’s neighborhood.

attacks to the silence attack only Therefore, the attackers
can only decrease the victim’s observations via the silence
attack, and they cannot increase the observations. We call
this type of attack the Decrease-Only attack (in short DecOnly). It is formally defined in the following:

The above attacks can be combined to form a variety
of new attacks. Regardless of how they are combined, two
key observations can be made for any compromised node
(assume that this compromised node comes from group
i). First, the number of observations on groups other than
group i can only be increased. This is because a compromised node cannot stop the non-compromised nodes from
broadcasting their group memberships. However, a compromised node can broadcast multiple messages claiming
it comes from other groups, thus increasing the observations on those groups. Second, the number of observation
on group i can be decreased by only one for each compromised neighbors from group i; this is achieved via the silence attack.
We have generalized the various attacks into two classes,
and have defined them in a unified framework. In our definitions, we let x represent the total number of compromised
nodes in a sensor’s neighborhood. Let a = (a1 , . . . , an ) be
what a node can observe when none of its neighbors is compromised. Let o = (o1 , . . . , on ) be what a node has actually
observed when up to x of its neighbors are compromised.

Definition 5 (Dec-Only Attack) We say that an attack is a
Dec-Only attack if any observation o resulting from this attack satisfies the following condition:
oi ≤ ai , for i = 1, . . . , n,
n
X
(ai − oi ) ≤ x.
i=1

The Dec-Only attacks are less powerful than the DecBounded because of the assumptions and constraints made
on the attackers’ behaviors; some of the assumptions might
not be realistic in sensor network applications. Therefore,
the Dec-Only attacks only have theoretic value; in our evaluation, we mainly focus on the powerful Dec-Bounded attacks.

6.3. Impacts of the Attacks
An adversary may launch the above attacks to decrease
the detection rate of the LAD scheme, so that it has a greater
chance to convince sensor nodes to take false locations
without noticing the localization anomalies. Similarly, an
adversary may also increase the false alarm rate by launching the above attacks (without compromising the localization scheme). As a result, a sensor node may raise an alarm
and stop using the estimated location even if there is no localization anomaly. This will certainly lead to a denial of
service (DOS) attack against the localization service. Obviously, the more sensor nodes the adversary can compromise and the less constraints on the adversary’s capabilities,
the more the adversary can decrease the detection rate or
increase the false alarm rate. We will investigate how well
LAD can tolerate these attacks through simulations in the
next section.
Because of the above attacks, it is possible that an adversary will simply launch DOS attacks against LAD rather
than compromising the localization scheme. We make two
observations about this threat. First, by launching such DOS
attacks, an adversary can only render the localization service unusable, but cannot convince a sensor node to accept a false location. In other words, if the LAD scheme
maintains an acceptable detection rate, it will narrow the
adversary’s choices down to DOS attacks. Second, such attacks are only sensible when they are less expensive than
attacking the localization scheme itself. Otherwise, an adversary can already achieve the DOS attacks at the localization phase; launching DOS attacks during the detection
phase cannot achieve extra benefit.

6.1. Dec-Bounded Attacks
When all the attacks described in Figure 3 are possible,
adversaries can make each observation oi arbitrarily larger
than ai , i.e. oi − ai can be as large as possible2 . However,
adversaries cannot make oi arbitrarily smaller than ai , because the adversaries cannot prevent the non-compromised
neighbors from broadcasting their membership. This means
that ai − oi has an upper bound. We call this type of attack the Decrease-Bounded (Dec-Bounded) attack. It is formally defined in the following:
Definition 4 (Dec-Bounded Attack) We say that an attack
is a Dec-Bounded attack if any observation o resulting from
this attack satisfies the following condition:
X
(ai − oi ) ≤ x.
∀i,ai >oi

6.2. Dec-Only Attacks
If we use authentication mechanisms along with the
wormhole detection mechanism [15], and also assume that
attackers cannot physically move sensors, we can limit the
2

Of course, oi must be bounded by the total number of nodes coming
from Group i.
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D-anomaly attack). We compute the expected observation µ at the location Le .

Based on the above discussion, it is necessary to compare
the difficulty to compromise LAD and the difficulty to compromise a localization scheme. Indeed, as discussed earlier,
all the current localization schemes are vulnerable, since
they were not developed to handle malicious attacks. Almost all of the range-based localization schemes and some
range-free schemes (e.g., [6, 30–32, 35, 36]) eventually reduce localization to a Minimum Mean Square Estimation
(MMSE) problem. Though this is effective to reduce the impact of measurement errors that occur during localization,
an adversary can still introduce arbitrarily large location errors by compromising a single anchor node and having the
compromised anchor node declaring a false location.
Some other range-free localization schemes (e.g., APIT
[12]) are more resistant to malicious attacks. However, the
correctness of location estimation is still dependent on the
anchor nodes, whose quantity is usually limited due to cost
reasons. These beacon nodes will become obvious targets.
An adversary can either compromise selected anchor nodes,
or simply replay beacons intercepted in other areas (without
compromising those anchor nodes) to launch attacks. Thus,
we believe attacking these localization schemes is not substantially more difficult than attacking LAD.
It is possible to enhance the security of existing localization schemes or develop new attack-resistant ones. However well these schemes work, they will still be vulnerable if
the adversaries are able to compromise sensor nodes. Thus,
having LAD as a second line of defense will still be valuable.

3. To simulate the Dec-Bounded or Dec-Only attacks against the LAD detection scheme, we generate a new observation o from a. The relationship
of o and a should comply with the constraints defined for those attacks. The generated (tainted)
observation o becomes node v’s actual observation.
There are many ways to generate o from a. We use a
greedy procedure to minimize the selected detection metric.
The underlying motivation is that if an attacker can reduce
the detection metric result to below the detection threshold,
its attacks on the localization will escape from being detected. The greedy procedure depends on both the metrics
and the types of attacks. There are 2 × 3 combinations of
attacks and detection metrics; the procedure for each combination is different. We will only describe how to simulate the Dec-Bounded attack to minimize the Diff metric; the
simulation of the other combinations can be achieved similarly. The idea of the procedure is to make oi as close to µi
as possible, so the Diff metric can be minimized. There are
two cases in our procedure (we let X be the number of compromised nodes within the sensor’s neighborhood):
1. If µi > ai , attackers can immediately increase ai by
(µi − ai ), thus getting oi = µi , because in the DecBounded attack, attackers can arbitrarily increase the
observations of any deployment group.
2. If µi < ai , attackers have to decrease ai to get closer
to µi . They can achieve this only via the silence attacks. However, each time the attackers decrease ai by
one, it must consume a compromised node. For each
ai > µi , we let oi = ai , and then we repeat decreasing both oi and X by one, until either oi = µi or X
reaches zero. X = 0 means there is no more compromised node to consume, so we cannot decrease the observation anymore.

7. Evaluation
This section provides a detailed quantitative analysis
evaluating the performance of our LAD scheme.

7.1. Experiments Setup and Methodologies
In our experiments, the deployment area is a square plane
of 1000 meters by 1000 meters. The plane is divided into
10 × 10 grids. Each grid is 100m × 100m. The center of
each grid is the deployment point. Figure 1 shows the deployment points. We still use m to represent the number of
nodes in each group and R to represent the transmission
range. We set the parameter σ of the Gaussian distribution
to 50 in all of the experiments.
To simulate attacks with the degree of damage D, we use
the following procedure:

Once the tainted observation o is simulated, we can use
our proposed detection metrics and the derived (from training) detection thresholds to conduct the anomaly detection.
Note that the purpose of our experiments is to evaluate
the anomaly detection method. Thus, we will use different
thresholds to evaluate the detection rate and the false positive rate.

7.2. Selecting a Localization Scheme

1. We randomly pick a node v at the location La , and get
the actual (non-tainted) observation a at the location.

Our proposed LAD scheme is a general detection
scheme that is independent of localization schemes. It assumes that the estimated location is already obtained using any of the localization schemes; it then detects whether

2. We simulate an attack against the localization of node
v by letting v’s estimated location be a random location Le , where |Le − La | = D (which simulates the
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the estimated location is consistent with its observations.
However, the performance of the LAD scheme does depend on the specific localization schemes. For different
schemes, the detection threshold derived from training will
be different; thus the false positive and the detection rate
will be different. Therefore, in this paper, to evaluate the
performance of the LAD scheme, we must combine it with
a specific localization scheme. We choose to study LAD for
the beaconless localization scheme [8] in this paper. The
methodology for studying the LAD scheme for other localization schemes is similar, and will be pursued in our future
work.
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Figure 4. Receive Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves for different detection metrics
and different degrees of damage D: DR-FPM-D (x = 10%, m = 300, T=“Dec-Bounded Attack”). Note: the scales for both x-axis and y-axis
in different figures are different.

• m: the density of the network.
• M : the detection metrics.
• T : the type of attacks.
• D: the degree of damage of an attack.
• x: the percentage of the compromised nodes.
• F P : the false alarm rate.

different detection metrics M and different degrees of damage D.

• DR: the detection rate.
To understand the effectiveness of our scheme, we have
selected five interesting parameter combinations to study.
We present the results in the rest of this section. We give
each figure (or each group of figures) a name using the parameters involved in that figure(s). The name follows the
format y-x-a, where the parameters y and x represent the yaxis and the x-axis, respectively; we will plot several curves
on the same figure, each using different values for the parameter a. For example, a could be the type of attacks T , the
degree of damage D, etc. Sometimes, we use y-x-a-b to represent a group of y-x-a figures, with each figure using a different value for the parameter b.

We fix the values for the other parameters as the followings: the percentage of the compromised nodes x is set to
10%, the network density m is set to 300 nodes per deployment group (there are 10 × 10 groups in our studies), and
the type of the attacks is set to the Dec-Bounded attacks, the
most powerful attacks against the localization among the
two attacks defined in our framework. The results are depicted in Figure 4 (Note that we have used different scales
for both x-axis and y-axis in different figures for better presentation effects):
The figure shows that the LAD scheme is more effective for attacks with higher degree of damage. For example,
when adversaries launch attacks with D = 120 (i.e., an successful attack must cause the localization error to exceed
120), the Diff metric can achieve almost 100% detection
rate with below 5% false positive rate; when attacks have
D = 160, the Diff metric can achieve 100% detection rate
without raising any false alarms. These results show that the
attackers’ damage to the localization schemes is limited. If
they want to cause a damage with a large D, the anomaly
will almost be certain to be detected.

7.4. ROC Curves for Different Metrics (DR-FPM-D)
The goal of this experiment is to understand the performance of the LAD scheme for three different metrics, including the Diff Metric, the Add-All Metric, and the Probability Metric. In intrusion detection, the Receive Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is usually used to measure
the performance of a detection method. The ROC curve is
a plot of intrusion detection accuracy against the false positive rate. It can be obtained by varying the detection threshold. In this experiment, we want to plot the ROC curves for

From the figures, we can also see that in general, the Diff
metric performs the best among the three metrics. Therefore, we will only use this metric in the rest of our studies.
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Figure 5. Receive Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves for different attacks with D = 40
and D = 80: DR-FP-T-D (x = 10%, m = 300,
M=“Diff Metric”)

Figure 6. Receive Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves for different attacks with D =
120 and D = 160: DR-FP-T-D (x = 10%, m =
300, M=“Diff Metric”)

7.5. ROC Curves for Different Attacks (DR-FP-TD)

significant enough to merit the cost.
In the rest of our experiments, we will only focus on the
Dec-Bounded attack.

The goal of this experiment is to understand the effectiveness of the anomaly detection under the Dec-Bounded
attacks and the Dec-Only attacks. Similar to the previous
figures, we let x = 10% and m = 300; we only use the Diff
metric.
We have plotted a number of ROC curves for different
types of attacks and different degrees of damage D. The results are depicted in Figures 5 and 6.
From the figure, we can see that the Dec-Bounded attack is the most powerful attack, namely, it is the most difficult one to detect, especially when D is small. For instance,
when D = 40, the detection rates for the Dec-Only attack
are high with small false alarm rates, but the detection rate
for the Dec-Bounded attack is still very low.
However, with the increase of D, the detection rate under
different attacks becomes less and less different. For example, when D = 120 and the false positive is below 2%, the
detection rate for the Dec-Bounded attacks is already over
99.5%, close to the detection rates (100%) achieved by the
Dec-Only attacks. This useful observation tells us that to detect the attacks with large degree of damage, we do not need
to use the expensive authentication and wormhole detection
mechanisms to prevent the powerful Dec-Bounded attacks.
Although these mechanisms can achieve significant benefits for small D, when D is high, the benefits become not

7.6. Detection Rate vs. Degree of Damage (DR-Dx)
The goal of this experiment is to study how the degree
of damage D affects the detection rate. To this end, we let
m = 300, false positive rate F P = 0.01, and T be the DecBounded attack; we use the Diff metric only. We plot curves
for x = 10%, x = 20%, and x = 30%. The results are depicted in Figure 7.
The figure clearly shows that when the degree of damage D is low, the detection rate is very low. This indicates that our scheme is not very effective for the attacks
that cause small degree of damage. This result is caused by
the localization schemes, because most of the localization
schemes (except GPS-based) cannot achieve very high accuracy; when the D is too small, it is difficult to distinguish
whether the anomaly is caused by attackers or by localization errors.
However, when the degree of damage D becomes large,
the results show that the LAD detection scheme can more
clearly distinguish anomalies from normal. Therefore, the
detection rate is approaching 100% with the increase of the
D, when the false positive rate is limited to 1%. This property of our LAD scheme indicates that if attackers want
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Figure 8. Detection Rate vs. the Percentage
of Compromised Nodes: DR-x-D (F P = 0.01,
m = 300, M=“Diff Metric”, T=“Dec-Bounded
Attack”).

to cause more severe damage, they will be detected with
higher probability. In other words, a successful attack’s
damage is always limited to a small distance, which does
little harm to most of the sensor network applications.

In our experiment, we let the false positive rate F P =
0.01, T be the Dec-Bounded attack, and we use the Diff
metric. The results are depicted in Figure 9.
The figure shows that when the network density m increases, the detection rate increases. However, such an increase is not caused by the LAD detection scheme, but by
the beaconless localization scheme. As we know, when m
increases, the localization becomes more accurate; in other
words, the distance between the estimated location Le and
a sensor’s actual location La decreases. Such a decrease
makes it easier to separate a normal behavior from anomaly.
Therefore, when m increases, the detection threshold can
be made smaller while still being able to maintain the
same level of the false positive rate. The consequence of
the smaller detection threshold is that it is easier to catch
anomalies.

7.7. Detection Rate vs. Node Compromise Ratio
(DR-x-D)
The goal of this experiment is to study how much of node
compromise can be tolerated by our LAD scheme. To this
end, we let m = 300, false positive rate F P = 0.01, and T
be the Dec-Bounded attack, and we use the Diff metric. We
plot curves for D = 80, D = 120, and D = 160. The results are depicted in Figure 8.
The figure shows that the higher the degree of damage D
the higher the tolerance. For instance, when D = 160, the
LAD detection scheme can tolerate up to 50% of the node
compromises without significant drop in its detection rate.
On the other hand, when D = 80, the detection rate drops
rapidly if the node compromise percentage reaches 15%.

8. Conclusion and Future Work
We propose an anomaly detection scheme named LAD
for wireless sensor networks to detect anomalies in localization. The LAD scheme takes advantage of the deployment
knowledge and the group membership of its neighbors, and
uses such knowledge to find out whether the estimated location Le is consistent with its observations. If they are inconsistent, LAD will report an anomaly. We have studied various properties of the LAD scheme. Our simulation results
show that LAD can effectively detect localization anomalies, even if a significant portion of the neighbors is com-

7.8. Detection Rate vs. Network Density (DR-m-xD)
Network density m plays an important role in the beaconless localization scheme. The localization becomes
more and more accurate when the network density m increases. An interesting question is whether the density
affects the LAD scheme. We have conducted an experiment to answer this question.
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Figure 9. Detection Rate vs. Network Density: DR-m-x-D (F P = 0.01, M=“Diff Metric”,
T=“Dec-Bounded Attack”).

promised. Our simulation also shows that the more harmful an anomaly is, the higher the detection rate is, and at the
same time the lower the false positive rate is, i.e., with the
LAD scheme, it is difficult for adversaries to cause a large
localization error without being detected.
In our future work, we will study another factor that
can affect the effectiveness of the LAD scheme. This factor is the accuracy of the deployment knowledge model. If
this model cannot accurately model the actual deployment,
there will be extra errors (both on false positive and detection rate) in the anomaly detection. We will study the properties of this kind of errors in our future work.
Our work only achieves the first step toward secure localization in sensor networks. Our ultimate goal is not only
to detect the anomalies, but also to correct the errors caused
by the anomalies.
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